Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
मनोहर पर्रिकर रक्षा अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण संस्थान

Rising US-Iran Hostilities: Implications for Africa

Nagapushpa Devendra
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Tension between the US and Iran escalated after the assassination of Iranian military commander, General Qassim Soleimani by the Trump administration on January 3, 2020. Tehran launched a series of missile attacks on a military base that hosts American troops in Iraq. This is the first direct engagement between both the countries since the naval battle precipitating the Vincennes event on July 3, 1998. Though there has been ease in tension after Iran mistakenly shoot down of Ukrainian Flight 752 amid the escalation killing all 176 people on January 8, the crisis is hardly over.

The Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),1 and its affiliated militias2 in the region and beyond are still fuming. They issued statements saying that the missile strike in Iraq is only a first step in their reprisal and that the crisis is not over: It has been paused. They have also warned countries that helped Washington to execute the assassination.3 In response, the US officials said they would preemptively attack Iranian backed forces that they perceived as a threat in the region.4 International community urged Iran and US to restraint, the offensive and engage through diplomacy.

At this point, the pressure for the Iranian government to retaliate against the US is considerable, but an offensive act against the American troops or bases in the region would eliminate any prospects for the US administration to reconcile with Iran. Instead, Washington will likely respond with punitive measures and sanctions. Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy in the aftermath of US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018, has deteriorated Iranian economy both internationally and domestically. Anti-government demonstrations kept erupting time to time, and its role in Syria and Iraq pushed back. Most importantly, aggressive retaliation would make it harder for Europe and its major allies like Russia and China to continue supporting Tehran in the international forum.

On the other hand, Iran also cannot stay quiet given its reputation for leadership in the region. Secondly, lack of response from the government can further widen the fictions between the IRGC and the power centers in Iran, including religious authorities, bureaucracy, and traditional elites in the long-run. But for now, Iranian government is likely to focus on the internal matters and may use Solemani’s assassination to unite the country against US and its allies, particularly Israel.5

The IRGC, as well will refrain from attempting any kind of offensive act for two reasons. Firstly, after Solemani, Corps power inside the country has shrunk in the absence of a replacement leader of Solemani’s status and power. Secondly, the on-going economic crisis has placed the Corps in direct confrontation with the people who aren’t appeased with their policies outside Iran.6 Therefore, the Corps will try to show their flexibility in responding to internal pressures while not trying to attract further sanctions on their entities, which plays a major role in shaping Iranian economy.7 At the same time they will attempt to regain its status in home, which might take some time.

However, unlike the Iranian government and the IRGC, its proxy groups or militias are not bound by any such internal or external pressures. Their sole purpose is to cast out American troops from parts of Africa and West Asia.8 Solemani was like a father figure to these groups. Most of the proxy groups have already vowed vengeance.9 Therefore, it seems likely that if there is any further retaliation, they may not necessarily come from the Iranian government or the IRGC, but will come from these proxy groups in the region who may look for soft targets in areas the US least expects a counterblow. 

These developments have put the African nations in a perplexing situation, given their geo-political and geo-economic stakes in the US on the one hand, and their developing strategic partnership with the Iranian government on the other hand. Iran has established close ties in the continent, particularly with the nations that are antagonistic towards US presence, stand against the unilateral actions, and were swift to speak out against the violation of sovereignty of weak states by the great powers in the international forum. To further strengthen Tehran’s grip on the continent, the IRGC had pushed forward its agenda of establishing Shi’ite armed forces. They managed to form several proxy groups who have been active in moving against the US and its allies’ interests in parts of the African continent. 

In the light of this background, Africa may face a challenging situation in future where it must deal with the American interests on the continent. Simultaneously, it needs to secure its interest vis-à-vis the Iranians and take precautionary measures to keep a tap on the activities of various Iranian proxy groups in order to protect the US personnel and civilians in the continent.

Africa- new focus of US-Iran rivalry

Africa has become a new arena of contest between the US and Iran. But, since international focus remains centered on the Persian Gulf and the Levant, Africa’s significance is often overlooked. This is surprising given the fact that both sides see so much potential in the continent that they have been developing ties on both economic and security fronts. In the recent months, their race to influence Africa has sharpened. This has forced America to take an aggressive stance, at least rhetorically, to challenge Tehran’s ambitions. We also witness a robust foreign policy under the leadership of President Donald Trump. 

Following 9/11, the US played a major role in Africa due to the US administration’s policy of mobilizing the world on the so called, “War on Terror”. The US administration rationed out its economic aid for the African nations based on its commitment to countering terrorism, which led to the establishment of strategic US military bases and areas for military exercise.10 Under the Trump administration, Pentagon’s approach to Africa expanded beyond military cooperation. In December 2018, the Trump administration rolled out a new strategy for engaging Africa. The strategy, as outlined by then National Security Adviser John Bolton, is built on the basis of these three aspects: 

  1. Advancing American and African prosperity through increased commercial ties
  2. Enhancing security through counter-terrorism efforts
  3. Promoting American interests and African “self-reliance” through a more targeted and selective use of the US foreign aid.11  

In reality, this strategy’s over-arching purpose is to contain the Iranian and its allies (Russia-China) influence in the continent. In recent years, Iran’s engagement in Africa grew more rapidly than America’s. Iran adopted a pragmatic form of diplomacy towards African nations to decrease the impact of the US’s unilateral sanction. Trade has become an integral element of new Iran-Africa relationship.

According to Iranian officials, the value of Iranian foreign direct investment in South Africa alone is estimated to be $135 billion, whereas for the US, despite being the largest trade partner of the continent, its trade with South Africa was $14 billion in 2018.12 In 2019, the Iranian investment in South Africa decreased to a very large extent, given its crippled economy and secondary sanctions. It was estimated that trade between Iran and South Africa was below than $100 million,13 whereas the US investment in South Africa was $7.8 billion in 2019, 6.8% increase from the previous year. Nevertheless, South Africa continued to remain committed to support Iran against the US sanctions.14

Furthermore, Iran has developed a special interest in East African countries where there is limited or reduced US naval presence,15 especially those in the Horn of Africa, and Red Sea.16 Periodic docking by warships at the ports were pointers of Iranian presence in East Africa. Iranian corps believes that establishing naval bases is not less than developing nuclear technology.17 Iranian Navy maintains the ports of Sudan,18 Eritrea,19 Djibouti,20 and Tanzania21 as its primary base in the Red Sea. There are also unsubstantial claims of Tehran using its naval bases in Africa states like Somalia to smuggle weapons22 along Tanzania for uranium23 .

West Africa is vital to US interests in terms of counter-terrorism operations and energy resources. Every year, the US-led exercise is conducted in this part of Africa in order to provide critical training for regional militaries struggling to counter growing terror- activities. However, the US administration is considering the withdrawal some 5000-7000 troops across the continents. This includes 1000 military personnel from West Africa,24 particularly Niger, Chad and Mali.25 The US officials warned the administration that the withdrawal will degrade the security situation in this region of West Africa where deep religious-ethnic division, poverty and vast ungoverned space provide an ideal breeding ground for extremism.26 Taking advantage of this situation, Iran is aggressively trying to acquire political, economic and military support throughout the continent. It has multiple economic projects in states like Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Sierra Leon, Benin, Nigeria and Ghana.

For Iran, Nigeria managed to gain particular importance in West Africa, given its largest Muslim population among which five to ten million are Shia’s,27 and strategic importance as one of the oil rich country in the continent. Also Nigeria has the history of supporting Iran, since its Islamic revolution in 1979. Since 2019, Iran is working towards improving its ties with the Nigerian government. Both the nations seek closer cooperation in areas of trade, investment, agriculture and technology transfer. The Iranian delegations have also declared it would explore investment in the automobile, community housing, and pharmaceutical industries.28  

Iran also tried to influence the country’s political system by supporting the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), who does not recognize the authority of the Nigerian government, and views its leaders both Muslim and Christian as corrupt. This group was banned in 2019 over the alleged “acts of terrorism and illegality”. So far, Iran has not publically condemned the banning, possibly because it does not want to jeopardize mediation efforts to secure the release of the group’s leader Sheikh Zakzaky and his wife.29

The African continent integrates well into Iranian policies and ambition to lead an anti-US front. In fact, President Hassan Rouhani has enunciated on several occasions that Iran was with Africa during its fight against the apartheid regime and now it is time for the continent to formulate an independent policy in the face of US aggression. He further stated that Iran enjoys close political, economic, and cultural relations with countries in Africa. And that it should not let the US’s illegal sanctions affect Iran-Africa relationship.30

Challenges

The US and Iranian attention to Africa is a blessing in disguise for the governments and the people in the continent. The competition has undoubtedly meant a financial and developmental windfall for the region as the two sides seek to re-gain their allegiance. These efforts have drawn the states into regional conflicts, not only between the US and Iran, but also among Iran and its allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. For example, in 2012-13, Iranian operatives (IRGC) were arrested in Kenya for planning to attack the US interests in the region.31 In 2015, Sudan completely severed its ties with Iran over its support to Omar al-Bashir’s government and participating in a Saudi-led intervention in the Yemen crisis on behalf of the Sunni Arab alliance. General Mohamd Hamdan Dagalo,32 the deputy chief of Sudan’s new Transitional Military Council, reiterated the same in 2019, when he met Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah.33 In 2016, two Iranian operatives and their Kenyan driver of local embassy were arrested on the charge of connection with a terrorist act after surveilling the Israeli embassy.34  

After JCPOA, Iran re-designed its Africa policy to counter the US and its allies.  IRGC and its proxy groups in the continent became more cautious and looks for plausible deniability to avoid detection of when, where and who they attack.

During this period, Iran used its soft-power as its ultimate mechanism to export its Islamic ideology more aggressively in the continent. The Iranian Revolution and ensuing events since 1979 has set up Islamism as an ideology to be reckoned with, sweeping up billions around the world along with capitalism and communism. Iran’s end goal with the revolution is not to create a state; it is the expansion of the revolution – the one true way of awakening the oppressed and liberating the Third World from colonialism and neo-colonialism.35

This revolutionary vision pushed Iran to funds Islamic organizations or cultural centers which allegedly distribute Shi’ite propaganda, and recruits local population to form smaller groups of armed force. It also exports its clergies to African nations, who in turn stage seminars and conferences with local clerics in an effort to indoctrinate Khomeinist doctrine.36 Representatives from various African countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Chad, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria, Mauritania, Senegal and Benin attend these Hajj talks. The outcome of such conferences is generally laced with anti-Saudi Arabia or anti-US propositions.

Exporting its ideology among Africa’s vast Muslim community paved the path for Iran to ally with the Shia-based armed forces like IMN in the continent. It is reported that Iran has instructed its strongest ally, the Hezbollah, to increase its training of Nigerians and hoped to use Abuja as a base of operation to launch attacks and thwart Israeli and Western ambitions in the continent.37 Given the Iranian influence, it comes as no surprise that Soleimani’s death has triggered “red alert” in Nigeria, fearing reactions by the IMN or other alleged Iranian proxies who have vowed to punish the US for the Baghdad assassination.38  

Iran is also alleged to be covertly engaged with al-Shabab in Mogadishu. The UN reportedly provided substantial evidence that demonstrates Iran’s arming and funding of al-Shabab.39 It stated that Somalian fighters were offered various incentives to join Iran-backed Hezbollah’s activities in the continent. As per the document, an individual fighter earns at least $2000, and if the fighters are killed, between $25,000 to $30,000 is provided to their family. Also, the fighters after returning home from Lebanon or Syria receives a monthly stipend of $100 for unspecified period of time.40   

The most interesting part here is that, while the IMN was contemplating its revenge, Somalian militants of al-Shabab pulled the plug by killing three American civilians in Kenya. In past, Iranian ambassador to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, stated that Iran cannot be held responsible for the actions of other groups in the region and beyond.41 Here it is notable that States often deny the fact that they are supporting or funding such groups. In most of the cases, other states may not know the amount of support a proxy group receives from another state.42 Also, proxy groups offer a way of fighting that can limit the escalations.

The attack in Kenya seems to be a grim reminder of that fact that Shia proxies can target American soldiers anywhere in the continent. If we dissect the Iranian support to Shia-based groups in Africa, we discover that its influence is not limited to Nigeria and Somalia (quid pro quo, the US maintains heavy military outposts in both these countries). Though there is little information disclosed on the Tehran purported front in Africa, its activities providing social services though vast network of hospital and orphanages have increased to a large extent in recent years. Hundreds of Iranian Islamic schools and seminaries played a major role in further deepening its ties with African nations. Some of them are as follows: 

  1. Senegal: Iran supports and funds the Islamic community whose members are mostly from the Niassene branch of the Tijani brotherhood and students/teachers from the Dakar University;43  
  2. South Africa: It supports the Karballah Foundation for Liberation, a Lebanese Islamic Association; a branch in Johannesburg, which collaborates closely with Islamic Culture and Relation organization of Ahl-al Bait, Cape Town;
  3. Sierra Leone: The Islamic Organizations in Freetown headed by Ahmad Tejan Sillah44
  4. Tanzania: A seminary called Imamm Sadigh in Dar Es-Salaam;45
  5. Sub- Saharan African countries: Al-Mustafa University; adding to that, the university also has branches and seminaries in Cameroon, Malawi, Mali;46
  6. Guinea: The Ahl al-Bait school;
  7. Ivory Coast: The Zeynab seminary;
  8. Madagascar: A branch of the university in the capital of Antananarivo. Other affiliated centers include Imam Sadjad Mosque, the RasulAkram Mosque and the Islamic Center of Dar al-Quran in the city of Mahajanga. 

Iran has already demonstrated its ability to conduct subversive activities in Africa, directly or indirectly through Hezbollah. The Baghdad assassination is likely to bolster such activities and further stimulate anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiments in the continent. Iran has ordered IRGC to establish smaller groups to target US military bases in the continent. Iranian cells are said to be active in countries like Sudan, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Gambia and the Central African Republic.47 In the long-run, the US and its allies will view Iranian activities in the continent as threats to their interests. This could trigger an aggressive policy against the Iranian proxies in the continent as they did in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Any such actions can cause profound effects in the region and beyond. 

*Ms. Nagapushpa Devendra is a Research Analyst, West Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

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