Africa and the G20

Bilateral and multilateral interest in Africa’s development is plentiful, but has been seen as not very effective. So the launch of yet another new initiative, this time by the G20 in July 2017, beckons some reflection. The G20s focus on Africa is not new, though somewhat unique. Over the period of the last decade, other informal multilateral groups have also sought to address Africa’s issues. The BRICS have for long focused on Africa; their relationship is symbiotic.1 Their association with Africa had been through trade, FDI and development assistance to wring “mutual benefit and solidarity rather than on gift giving or pure commerce”.2 The G8 too has been in a mode of “partnership” with Africa especially for a decade since the year 2000.3 The UK4 and Germany have been instrumental in putting Africa on the G8 agenda.5 The Africa Action Plan of the G8 (2002) was launched to augment the NEPAD. However, not many targets set were met; and these initiatives remained philanthropic in nature, with little focus on trade, investment and governance issues.6 What then is the nature and significance of the latest G20 effort?

G20’s Compact with Africa (CwA)

At the Hamburg Summit of the G20, July 7-8, 2017, G20 Africa Partnership was launched.7 The partnership, called Compact with Africa (CwA) is aimed at promoting private investment and non-commercial infrastructure in Africa. It consists of related initiatives such as #eSkills4Girls, Rural Youth Employment, African Renewable Energy and facilitates investment compacts. The partnership was made supplementary to the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), with an implementing and monitoring role for the AU and the NEPAD.8 The partnership was devised jointly by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for the G20 Finance Deputies for inclusion in the G20 finance track 9 The partnership was able to attract ten African countries in 2017- Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, and Tunisia joined in March 2017; Ethiopia and Ghana joined in June 2017; and Benin, Egypt and Guinea joined in October 2017. A permanent Africa Advisory Group was set up within the G20. By October 2017, the G20 had mapped all available avenues-government, firm and investors, both bilateral and multilateral, for specific countries, as well as common platforms available to facilitate the Compact.10 It is the first time that representatives of the AU (Guinea) and the NEPAD (Senegal) were invited as guests for the Summit. 11

G20 Focus on Africa: A History12

The first reference to Africa in the G20 came in the Toronto Summit of the G20 in 2010 which made a commitment to ensure that concessional lending facilities to the African Development Bank (AfDB) would continue despite the financial crisis of 2008.13 The Annex to the declaration refers to a 200 per cent increase in the capitalisation of the AfDB which would increase its funds from $1.8 billion to $6 billion and a corresponding increase in the annual lending to it. This was done since Africa was lagging behind in the achievement of millennium development goals.14 It also mentioned the particular concerns of food security and agriculture modernisation as pertinent immediate concerns that the G20 must look into as priority.15

At the Seoul Summit held later in 2010, the importance of regional economic integration in Africa was recognised and the G20 countries committed to help with that through trade facilitation and building regional infrastructure.16 It was also decided that two of Africa’s countries would be among the five non-member invitees to G20 summits.17 The Multi-year Action Plan on Development pledged to support existing initiatives and facilities in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), African Water Facility (AWF) and the Investment Climate Facility for Africa, in addition to requesting the AfDB to identify barriers to regional trade integration in Africa.18 It also pointed to the need for the African Tax Administration Forum to improve tax collection to aid domestic mobilization of resources. Among the specific policy commitments by G20 countries, Japan pledged to double its ODA to Africa over the 2007 level by 2012, Canada doubled its G8 Gleneagles commitment on its aid to Africa and its G8 L’Aquila commitment to double its food security aid to Africa and France announced the formulation of national policy for supporting sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa among four other regions.19

The G20 Cannes Summit Leaders’ Communique’ of 2011 made a reference to its “Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture” and its support for food security initiatives of the ECOWAS, NEPAD’s agricultural risk assessment initiative and the need for the G20 High Level Panel to support NEPAD’s infrastructure projects in Africa.20 Under the French presidency, financing of infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa was a priority and 5 of 11 such projects were identified were in the region.21 On food security, with G20 support, the ECOWAS pilot project of creating a food reserve was initiated.22 The G20 Remittances Toolkit was launched to reduce the cost of remittances to mainly African countries.23

The Los Cabos Summit Declaration of 2012 made no additional commitment specific to Africa but took note of the food security initiatives in the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.24 Under the Mexican Presidency however, the African Development Bank teamed up with the World Bank, OECD and United Nations to produce a toolkit for Inclusive Economic Growth.25 The Los Cabos Summit launched the AgResults initiative to assess progress on the food security front.26 By December 2012, the ECOWAS pilot project was made a part of the Global Initiative for Resilience in Sahel and Western Africa (AGIR).27 The Tropical Agricultural Platform (TAP) was launched at the same time to assess particular requirements of agriculture in tropical countries. The Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) were prepared in October 2012.28

The St. Petersburg Leaders’ Declaration of 2013, announced its support for “Transparency in Trade”, a collaborative initiative of the AfDB, International Trade Centre, the UNCTAD and the World Bank to promote use of trade policy data and analysis for exploring opportunities for trade and facilitating them.29 It also announced the completion of the assessment of Project Preparation Facilities (PPFs) for Infrastructure in Africa.30 During the St. Petersburg Summit, the Development Working Group “welcomed the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) Assessment of Project Preparation Facilities (PPFs) for Infrastructure in Africa and the ICA held a workshop to launch a project preparation network.”31 Once this was completed in November 2012, based on the High Level Panel on Infrastructure and ICA report, the AfDB launched the Africa 50 Fund in November 2013 to channel $US 100 billion from public and private sources for infrastructure development in Africa.32

In 2013, the AgResults intermediary fund was set up within the World Bank to receive contributions for food security.33 To assess particular requirements of agriculture in tropical countries, the Tropical Agricultural Platform (TAP) was launched in December 2012, which started getting inputs from the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).34 Africa was one among the two areas for the field testing of the PRAI put together by the Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG, i.e. the FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank) in 2013.35 Moreover the G20 contributed to the integration of agriculture risk management in agricultural policies in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) through its association with NEPAD in the IFAD supported Platform Agricultural Risk Management (PARM).36 In line with the Seoul MYAP and the directions of the Development Working Group, the AfDB established the Trade Finance Plan in 2013 to enable the US$ 1 billion to be channel for trade facilitation in Africa.37 Duty Free and Quota Free trade and Aid for Trade are other policies from which Africa benefitted. The Australian presidency of the G20 in 2014 saw the IFC funded Global Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Finance Facility focus worldwide on very small SMEs in high impact, targeting several African SMEs.38

The Leaders Communiqué of the G20 Summit in Turkey in 2015 made specific reference to the first ever meeting of the Energy Ministers of the G20 and the adoption of the G20 Energy Access Action Plan: Voluntary Collaboration on Energy Access. The first phase of this programme was envisaged to focus on Sub-Saharan Africa since it faces the most acute energy crisis.39 52 countries of Africa, among other regions, also received attention of the Climate Finance Study Group of the G20 which designed a toolkit for better access to climate finance aimed at adaptation to climate change.40 A Practioner’s Dialogue on Climate Investment (PDCI) was initiated by Germany in 2015, and its 2016 edition was held in Africa in 2016. 41 The G20 Summit in China in 2016 launched an initiative for industrialisation of the LDCs and countries in Africa in the wake of the “new industrial revolution”.42 The G20 action plan on Agenda 2030 which was adopted after the Summit brought forth several countries’ commitments to help with the achievement of specific SDGs in Africa.43

Significance of the Compact

The G20’s focus on Africa, thus, is not new. So far the main areas of focus have been agriculture and food security; areas of limited focus have been climate and energy, infrastructure, trade and SMEs. Yet, the Compact is significant for several reasons.

In the context of the G20, first, for the first time in the history of G20 summits since 2009, there is a dedicated policy document on Africa.44 This may indeed be regarded as a high-point in the dyadic relationship; for in the earlier summits, priority was accorded to various issues of development the world over and particular focus on Africa came only as a corollary of that. Also, with the setting up of the Africa Advisory Group, Africa’s interests are somewhat institutionalised within the G20. Second, the compact attempts to bring together all existing projects and actors so as to synergise them and fill in the voids of private investment and infrastructure development in the Compact countries. Third, it seeks to channelise private investment in new and critical areas such as skill development of women and rural youth, as well as a focus on renewable energy.

In the larger context of bilateral and multilateral engagements with Africa, the Compact is not very unique. It recognises the agency of smaller individual African countries, beyond South Africa and Nigeria, a trend that has been on the ascendant for nearly a decade.45 Like many other initiatives, it also goes beyond the limited vision of providing ‘aid’ to enable its development to provisioning investments.46 And finally, the Compact is avowedly demand driven and focuses on human resource development, thus making it conceptually akin to South-South partnerships.

It also has several inherent limitations. Though G20 is more representative than the G8 and was effective in dealing with the financial crisis since 2008, it has been dogged by a crisis of legitimacy as a club of big nations, allegations of lack effectiveness on matters of global economic governance, and shifting priorities based on the rotating Chairmanship of the group.47 Moreover, it is an informal grouping of unequals with differing interests and visions. So, though proverbially well begun is half done, in this instance it may not be so.

Conclusion

An increased level of engagement of the G20 with Africa could be significant as it could activate the existing G20 initiatives. It is also significant because it proposes to venture into new and critical areas such as skill development of women and rural youth, as well as a focus on renewable energy which are fundamental to capitalise on increased private investment. Such fundamentals, if strengthened, would have a salutary impact on development in Africa. Discernible progress may also encourage other African countries to join the Compact.

Dr. Arpita Anant is Associate Fellow, ALACUN Centre, IDSA.

• 1. Brendan Vickers, “Africa and the Rising Powers: Bargaining for the Marginalized Many”, International Affairs, Vol. 89, No.3, 2013, pp. 673-693.
• 2. UNECA, Africa-BRICS Cooperation: Implications for Growth Employment and Structural Transformation in Africa, 2013, p.30, at https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/africa-brics_…, (Accessed July 13, 2017). AfDB, BRICS and Africa: A Win-Win Partnership, July 10, 2013, https://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/africa-and-the-brics-a-win-win-partnership-12098/ (Accessed August 02, 2017).
• 3. David Black, “The G8 and Africa: A Partial Reckoning”, Global Governance, Vol. 18, No.4, 2012, pp.441-447.
• 4. Ian Taylor, “Spinderella on the Safari: British Policies toward Africa under New Labour”, Global Governance, Vol. 18, No.4, 2012, pp. 449-460.
• 5. Ulf Engel, “The G8 and Germany’s Africa Policy: A Case of Hegemonic Mainstreaming”, Global Governance, Vol.18, No.4, pp. 471-476.
• 6. Ibid. The G8 have also supported capacity building in the realm of peace and security in Africa. See Alex Ransbotham, Alhaji M.S. Bah and Fanny Caldor, “Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Role for the UK and G8?” International Affairs, Vol.8, No. 2, 2005, pp.325-339.
• 7. G20 Germany 2017, Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration G20 Africa Partnership, Hamburg, July 8, 2017, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-annex-partnership-africa.html (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 8. G20 Germany 2017, G20 Leaders’ Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World, Hamburg, July 8, 2017, (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 9. G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governor’s Meeting, The G20 Compact with Africa, A Joint AfDB, IMF and WBG Report, Baden-Baden Germany, March 17-18, 2017, at https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/20… (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 10. G20 Compact with Africa, Toolbox: Instruments Available to Support Private Investment with Africa (sic) Countries,https://www.compactwithafrica.org/content/dam/Compact%20with%20Africa/inventoryofinstruments/cwa_inventory_2017.pdf (Accessed January 10, 2018).
• 11. Earlier, African countries were invited in their individual capacity as non-member invitees. In the G20 Hangzhou Summit in 2016, three African countries Chad, Egypt and Senegal were invited as special guests in their individual capacity. G20 China 2016, G20 Summit Participants, September 6, 2016, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-participants.html (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 12. See Zaria Shaw and Sarah Jane Vassallo, “G20 Leaders’ Conclusions on Africa 2008-2010”, G20 Research Group, August 8, 2011, at www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/conclusions/africa-l.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017). For a critical analysis on Africa and the G20 see Courtney Hallink, “The G20’s Governance of Africa Related Issues, 2008-2016”, G20 Research Group, June 1, 2017, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/g20-africa-2008-2016v2.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017). For a focus on climate change see Courtney Hallink, G20 Africa and Climate Governance: Past Performance and Prospects for Hamburg, Paper prepared for the conference on “The G20 and the Global Environment, Climate and Energy Agenda,” Bavarian School of Public Policy, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany, June 26, 2017, at www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/170626-hallink-g20-africa-climate.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 13. G20 Canada 2010, G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, June 27, 2010, paragraph 26, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-communique.html (Accessed July 13, 2017). A similar decision was made regarding the International Development Association.
• 14. Ibid, “Annex III: Enhancing the Legitimacy, Credibility and Effectiveness of the IFIs and Further Supporting the Needs of the Most Vulnerable”, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8.
• 15. Ibid, paragraph 24.
• 16. G20 2010 South Korea, G20 Seoul Summit Document, November 12, 2010, paragraph 45, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.html (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 17. Ibid, paragraph 74.
• 18. G20 Seoul Summit 2010, Annex II, Multi-Year Action Plan on Development, November 12, 2010, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-development.html (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 19. G20 Seoul Summit 2010, Table: Policy Commitments by G20 members, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 20. G20-G8 France 2011, Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building Our Common Future: Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, paragraphs 72, 74 and 75, Cannes, November 4, 2011, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-communique-111104-en.html (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 21. G20 2013 Russia, St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, 2013, p.10, p. 18, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017). The projects were the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP), Ethiopia and Kenya Power Systems Interconnection, Inga Hydropower, North-South Corridor (NSC) and the Isaka-Kigali Railway. In addition, 2 projects were for the Middle East and North Africa region: a Jordan Railway project and scaling Up Solar Energy in MENA for export to European Markets.
• 22. Ibid, p.25.
• 23. Ibid, p. 58.
• 24. G20 Mexico, G20 Leaders Declaration, Los Cabos, Mexico, June 19, 2012, paragraphs 55 and 59, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.html (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 25. G20 2013 Russia, St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, 2013, p.12, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 26. Ibid, p. 26.
• 27. Ibid, p.25.
• 28. Ibid, p. 26.
• 29. G20 2013 Russia, G20 Leaders’ Declaration, September 6, 2013, St Petersburg, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/2013-0906-declaration.html (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 30. Ibid, paragraph 81.
• 31. G20 2013 Russia, St Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments, 2013, p.12, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2013/Saint_Petersburg_Accountability_Report_on_G20_Development_Commitments.pdf (Accessed July 13, 2017).
• 32. Ibid, p.17.
• 33. Ibid, p. 26.
• 34. Ibid, p.27.
• 35. Ibid, p.30.
• 36. Ibid, p.31.
• 37. Ibid, p.50.
• 38. Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, 2014 Financial Inclusion Action Plan, September 2, 2014, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/2014_g20_financial_inclusion_action_plan.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 39. G20 2015 Turkey, Leaders’ Communique, Antalya, November 16, 2015, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/151116-communique.html (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 40. Extrapolated from Annex I, pp. 36-39, OECD, Toolkit To Enhance Access To Adaptation Finance For Developing Countries That Are Vulnerable To Adverse Effects Of Climate Change, Including LIDCs, SIDS And African States, August 2015, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/Toolkit-to-Enhance-Access-to-Adaptation-Finance-for-Developing-Countries-that-are-Vulnerable-to-the-Adverse-Effects-of-Climate-Change.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 41. G20 Climate Finance Study Group, Report to the Finance Ministers, September 2015, p.31, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2015/G20-Climate-Finance-Study-Group-Annual-Report-2015.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 42. G20 China 2016, G20 Leaders’ Communiqué: Hangzhou Summit, paragraph 13 and 35, Hangzhou, September 5, 2016, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/160905-communique.html (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 43. G20 2016 China, G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, September 8, 2016, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2016/g20-action-plan-on-2030-agenda.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2017).
• 44. Zaria Shaw and Sarah Jane Vassallo, n. 12. The authors make this point for the period 2008-2010, but this has remained so until the Hamburg Summit, 2017.
• 45. William Brown, “A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No.10, 2012, pp. 1889-1908.
• 46. Ian Taylor, “‘Advice is judged by results, not by intentions’: Why Gordon Brown is Wrong about Africa”, International Affairs, Vol. 81, No.2, 2005, pp.299-310.
• 47. Robert Wade, “Emerging World Order: From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank and the IMF”, Politics & Society, Vol. 39, No.3, 2011, pp.347-378, at pp.354-359. For a more nuanced critique see Courtney Hallink, June 1, 2017, n.12.