New Zealand’s Defence White Paper 2010

On November 2, 2010, the New Zealand government released the long-awaited and somewhat delayed Defence White Paper 2010. This was the first review of the country’s national defence posture after 13 years. When the John Key government came to power in 2008, it had promised to undertake a comprehensive defence review and therefore the White Paper delivers the promise to assess, examine and project New Zealand’s defence future and strategic outlook for the next 25 years. In view of the transformation taking place in the security and strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the Key government felt the urgency to address New Zealand’s security concerns and how it can respond to the emerging challenges.

The White Paper outlines the broad contours of New Zealand’s strategic future and defines the direction for the country’s Defence Forces. The Key government felt the need for a blueprint for the next 25 years so that the country can appropriately prepare itself to face any contingency adversarial to its interests. Tensions over control of maritime resources and controlling illegal migration, for example, are worrying. The 20-odd small Pacific Island countries look to New Zealand’s leadership and support when signs of instability lurk and the strategic balance starts shifting. Such a scenario puts the onus on New Zealand to prepare itself accordingly. Unless New Zealand enhances the current capabilities of its Defence Forces, it would not be able to meet the challenges. The White Paper, therefore, addresses the capabilities its Defence Forces need for operations at home and abroad, such as “ground forces, self-protection, air transport, air and surface maritime surveillance, and naval combat.”

As Prime Minister Key candidly stated in his foreword to the White Paper, “financial sustainability” was important as the effort was to maximize the benefits accruing from the financial allocation in the budget and its proper utilization. Since this called for reforms in the form of comprehensive redistribution and investment programme, the Defence Forces’ resources are to be transferred to the frontline by enhancing their deployable military capabilities.

Like the Prime Minister, Defence Minister Wayne Mapp too outlined in his Preface to the White Paper the priorities for the future roles of New Zealand Army, Navy and Air Force. In particular, he raised the issue of New Zealand’s responsibilities in conducting and leading missions in the South Pacific. Though White Paper 2010 sets the overall direction for defence over the next 25 years, “a fresh review will occur every five years to take account of strategic, fiscal, and other developments.”

The White Paper raises the issue of enhanced strategic uncertainty, a matter of concern for New Zealand. Here, the White Paper probably goes overboard by raising concerns that seem to be misplaced as the country’s strategic environment is relatively benign. As an island country deep down in the Pacific, New Zealand’s security is under no great direct threat from any external source, though turbulence in the neighbourhood would be a matter of concern. On the other hand, maritime commerce, for example, if affected either by an act of terrorist violence or by act of piracy or otherwise, would adversely affect New Zealand’s economic life line as foreign trade is too important for its economic future.

Yet, no sovereign country can overlook its security needs. Seen from this perspective, the White Paper highlighted four major areas in which Defence can contribute to the country’s national security interests: a safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches; a rules-based international order which respects national sovereignty; a network of strong international linkages; and a sound global economy underlined by open trade routes.

New Zealand is a small country with a small population, accounting for only 0.24 per cent of the world population and 0.27 per cent of global trade. Yet, its destiny lies in Asia. Its fastest growing population group is of Asian origin. Six of New Zealand’s ten most important trading partners are in the region. It has several offshore territories and a large exclusive economic zone. It also has defence and security responsibilities of three independent or semi-independent territories – the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. New Zealand’s concerns over fulfilling this responsibility are reflected in the Defence White Paper.

After the Labour government came to power in 1984, New Zealand took a strong anti-nuclear stance. By not allowing US-nuclear powered vessels to visit New Zealand ports, it violated treaty obligations leading to the virtual dissolution of the ANZUS treaty, which was crafted after World War II by US strategists to address the security interests of its allies in the Pacific. There was national uproar in New Zealand when the French conducted nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1980s and when French secret service agents bombed in 1985 the Greenpeace protest vessel Rainbow Warrior. New Zealand’s position toughened when the US refused to deny or confirm whether visiting American warships were carrying nuclear weapons or not.

This led New Zealand to pass the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act in 1987, which prohibits nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships to anchor in New Zealand ports or waters. Since then, the strategic environment in the Pacific and the power balance has shifted and New Zealand has started reassessing its position. It has realized that an international order based on values has served New Zealand’s interests in the past. However, in view of the fragility in the Pacific Island states stemming from non-traditional security threats, as a leader of the Pacific Islands Forum New Zealand has to be prepared for collective action to address these threats.

This does not suggest that New Zealand faces any direct military threat. It does not. Yet, if political instability, natural disasters and humanitarian crises hit the South Pacific island countries, its interests will be affected. The White Paper highlights this fact clearly. It mentions that New Zealand would consider the possible use of military force in the following circumstances: in response to a direct threat to New Zealand and its territories (not a likely possibility in the near term); in response to a direct threat to Australia (not likely too soon either); as part of collective action in support of a member of the Pacific Islands Forum (a sensible proposition); as part of New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)1 (right in spirit and practical in responsibility); and, if requested or mandated by the United Nations, especially in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region (an act of a responsible power in the world).

What comes out clearly in the White Paper is that New Zealand’s immediate priority seems to be to meet the immediate security challenges in its maritime zones and in the South Pacific. Also its identification for collective action under the FPDA seems a realistic proposition. Its limited deployable ground forces and two ANZAC-class frigates are adequate to meet the immediate security needs. However, if New Zealand intends to enhance its strategic position in the South Pacific, it needs to upgrade its logistic capability to support military deployment in the South Pacific or elsewhere when needed. The White Paper brings out this aspect clearly when it outlines New Zealand’s strategic outlook to 2035.

The Strategic Outlook to 2035 “surveys the overarching security context and then examines the future strategic environment in the light of the four enduring national security interests to which Defence especially contributes.” The White Paper notes the major shift in the distribution of global economic power. Though China has displaced Japan as the second largest economy in the world, America’s relative decline is unlikely to catapult China to first position any time soon. That will take many years, though the global financial crisis may help accelerate this shift. Yet, the relative shift in economic weight is expected to continue. This will inevitably have implications for the distribution of global military power as growing economies can afford to allocate more resources for their militaries.

The White Paper also notes the challenges from weak states and terrorism. A strong country such as the US could not prevent 9/11. India, a rising economic power, also could not prevent 26/11. There is no guarantee that such an incident would not occur again. World forums can design preventive mechanisms but not full proof ones. Weak states will continue to provide safe havens to terrorists, either with or without local support.

Though a rules-based international order has been reasonably successful, consensus sometimes eludes the world on crucial issues. Trans-boundary challenges such as proliferation, terrorism, emergence of new technologies, illegal resource extraction, and unregulated movement of people would continue to remain major challenges for the international community. The White Paper, therefore, outlines the importance of New Zealand’s strong international linkages to address some of these issues.

As regards India, the White Paper highlights that its engagement with India both bilaterally and in regional institutions will continue to expand. India’s growing economic and military power will continue to give it a stronger voice in the region and internationally. New Zealand is crafting its Asia policy by engaging India accordingly.

• 1. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) provide a framework for defence cooperation between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom, and came into being on 1 November 1971.