Arab Spring and Sectarian Faultlines in West Asia: Bahrain, Yemen and Syria
About the Book
Since the outbreak of the Arab unrest, sectarian politics has become more pronounced throughout the West Asian region which is reflected in the growing polarisation of society and politics on narrow sectarian lines. Rulers have adopted sectarian approaches as a measure to secure their regimes. Opposition forces have also united themselves on the basis of their sectarian affiliations. This book focuses on three countries – Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, where protests have taken place during the Arab uprisings and who have witnessed widespread violence and political instability. The role of two major regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia has been extremely critical in all these three countries. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have used sectarianism as a foreign policy tool to pursue their interests in the region. They have been found to be involved in a ‘proxy war’ in these countries by the way of supporting either the regime or the opposition forces. Similarly the involvement of the two extra-regional powers, the US and Russia, especially in Syria has proven to be crucial for the security and geopolitics of the region. Sectarian faultlines has been widening since the outbreak of the unrest and has affected the political and security situation in West Asia.
Contents
Preface
- Arab Spring and Sectarian Politics in West Asia
- The US Invasion of Iraq and Sectarian Politics in West Asia
- Arab Spring and Sectarian Politics
- Key Players
- Saudi Arabia
- Iran
- Turkey
- Qatar
- Changing Geopolitical Context and the Saudi-Iran Sectarian
- Confrontation
- The P5+1 Nuclear Deal with Iran
- Politics of Military Coalitions
- Operation North Thunder
- Arab League and the Proposal of a Joint Arab Military Force
- Saudi Arabia Severs Ties with Iran
- Involvement of Extra-regional Players
Conclusion
- Bahrain: Protests and the Sectarian Politics
- Politics, Demography and Sectarianism
- Popular Protests
- Role of the Opposition
- Response of the State
- National Dialogue: The Regime’s Reconciliation Move
- Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI)
- Saudi Arabia and Protests in Bahrain
- GCC Support for the Khalifa Regime
- Iran and the Protests in Bahrain
- The US and Protests in Bahrain
- Conclusion
- Yemen: Political Instability and Sectarian Strife
- Beginning of the Protests
- GCC Initiative and the National Dialogue Conference
- Houthis and their Advance to Sanaa
- Saudi Concerns in an Unstable Yemen
- Saudi Arabia and Houthis
- Saudi-led Military Coalition
- Operation Decisive Storm
- Operation Restoring Hope
- Iran and the Yemen conflict
- American Involvement
- The UN and the Crisis in Yemen
- Al-Qaeda and ISIS Gaining Ground
- Humanitarian Crisis
- Into the Future
- The Syrian Conundrum
- The Regime’s Forces
- Hezbollah
- Opposition to the Regime 100
- Syrian National Council (SNC)
- National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces
- The High Negotiation Committee (HNC) of the Opposition Forces
- Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Jihadi Resistance
- Syria and Regional Geopolitics
- GCC States and Syrian Crisis
- Iran and Syrian Crisis
- UN, US and Russia: Power Politics over Syria
- Saudi Arabia, Iran and the ISIS
- Humanitarian Crisis
- Conclusion
- The Regime’s Forces
- Sectarianism in West Asia: Key Trends
- Sectarian Politics: Key Trends
- Deteriorating Saudi-Iran Relationship
- Internal Discrimination by the Regimes
- Use of the Sectarian Card for Foreign Policy Objectives
- Resiliency of the Royal Regimes
- Role of the Military during Conflict
- Intervention by External Players
- Tribal Loyalties and Governance System
- Growing Trends of Extremism and Terrorism
- The Rise of ISIS
- Growing Challenges from Non-state Actors
- Nexus between Islamists and Regional Powers
- Lack of Political Consensus to Resolve Crises
- Developments in West Asia affecting World Politics
- Into an Uncertain Future
- Sectarian Politics: Key Trends
Index
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