India’s current nuclear doctrine does not call for an automatic massive retaliation for Pakistan’s use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistan soil. However, this does not mean that such an attack will go unanswered.
The outcome of the NSG plenary in Seoul is most likely to be the admission of India to the NSG, denial or postponement of a decision on Pakistan’s application, but deferment of both announcements to a later date.
India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.
In principle there is nothing wrong in revisiting the doctrine but such revisions/reviews must be based on sound and valid reasons. The proponents of the doctrinal review argue that India’s existing doctrine is ill-suited to deter Pakistan from using tactical nuclear weapons against India.
The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.
