India

Following the arrest of one of the most wanted insurgent leaders of Assam, the state government must immediately act tough against other insurgent groups operating in the hill districts of the state.

• M. Amarjeet Singh
• June 12, 2009
• Comment

The Taliban is doubtless a menace and requires to be combated. Towards this end the Global War on Terror, recently rechristened ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’, has been underway for the better part of this decade. The Taliban, however, only appears to be growing in strength and in the spread of its reach. Therefore, the Obama administration is simultaneously pursuing a policy of reaching out to the ‘moderate’ Taliban. It hopes to whittle down the Taliban, permitting an early exit of the US from the region.

• Ali Ahmed
• June 08, 2009
• Comment

The threat from the Taliban could be in the form of heightened infiltration attempts across the Line of Control or see a new breed of Talibanised Pakistani militants targeting the Indian hinterland or a combination of both.

• Harinder Singh
• June 02, 2009
• Issue Brief

Terrorism, maritime security and border management are the key challenges in India's neighbourhood

• Untitled
• May 28, 2009
• Policy Brief

Environmental degradation, climate change and ozone depletion are complex challenges which need to be addressed by society. The equipment intensive military with high budgets, fossil fuel consumption, and extensive use of chemicals also owns prime real estate such as military stations and cantonments.

• P. K. Gautam
• May 18, 2009
• Comment

A decade after the Kargil conflict and over seven years after the major Indian military mobilization along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, both countries were yet again on the verge of a military confrontation following the revelation of Pakistan's complicity in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. Islamabad's recalcitrance in taking action against groups responsible for this attack forced New Delhi to plan punitive responses against terror camps within Pakistan, prompting the latter to mobilize troops and project a capability to repulse an Indian attack.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Ten years later, the Kargil War still arouses deep emotions turning around Pakistan's gross perfidy, an intelligence failure, great heroism, military improvisation and innovation, a national upsurge, a most open inquiry leading to a comprehensive review of vital issues long closed to scrutiny and reform. Its report, prepared in record time, was uniquely presented to the nation as a commercial publication. (From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report, Sage, New Delhi, December 1999.)

• B. G. Verghese
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The Kargil conflict can be categorized as a 'limited war'. It was initiated by Pakistan to achieve mixed military and political objectives, but made important misjudgments that doomed the enterprise to failure. The questions discussed in this article are: why was India surprised; why did both countries observe such great restraint; did the Kargil conflict have a nuclear dimension; and is 'limited war' a viable concept with nuclear deterrence obtaining in South Asia. It also argues that the Kargil conflict was an exception, in some dimensions, to the 'stability-instability paradox'

• P. R. Chari
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The two global trends of multipolarity (rising powers) and non-polarity (failing states) are strongly present in the South Asian geopolitical context. India's competitive-cooperative relationship with China is clearly part of the multipolar trend of rising powers throughout the world, while India's long, antagonistic history with Pakistan is increasingly witness to a weakening and radicalized Pakistani state. In this mixed strategic environment, Indian nuclear weapons are neither a global bane nor a coercive form of power for compelling a lopsided agreement with Pakistan on Kashmir.

• Michael Kraig
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations.

• Rahul Roy Chaudhury
• May 2009
• Strategic Analysis