Defence Procurement

It may perhaps be useful to examine some features of India’s Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) for streamlining of the capital acquisition process for defence procurement. After all, the DPP may well be the only procurement regulation in the world that discriminates against its own domestic bidders

• Sandeep Verma
• May 28, 2014
• Comment

A country’s response to external threats and internal security challenges is based on its defence preparedness, advance planning for contingencies and the political will. The new government will have to make key decisions on different aspects of defence reforms. This Policy Brief puts forward some suggestions.

• Untitled , Defence Economics & Industry Centre
• May 22, 2014
• Policy Brief

If we have no qualms about importing from other countries why cannot we buy ammunition from our own private sector companies? While restrictions could apply to production of small arms and ammunition, for large calibre arms and ammunition there is a case for permitting the private sector companies to chip in.

• Amit Cowshish
• April 03, 2014
• Comment

The Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, as also its earlier versions, does not define an Indian company. Some would argue that the answer is very simple: any entity registered in India under the Companies Act, 2013 or any other relevant statute and operating with a valid license, where such a license is required, qualifies as an Indian company, enterprise, institution or establishment.

• Amit Cowshish
• January 22, 2014
• Comment

While there was perhaps no option for the MoD but to do what it has done, it would be naive to expect the seller to acquiesce in forfeiture of the bank guarantees, recovery of the sums allegedly paid in violation of the PCIP (assuming that it will be possible to recover this amount) and to simply take the three helicopters back without demur.

• Amit Cowshish
• January 06, 2014
• Comment

India-US defence ties are shifting away from a ‘buyer-seller’ path to one of co- development and co-production. In Washington this is viewed as a change from a ‘culture of presumptive no to one of presumptive yes’.

• Vivek Kapur
• October 15, 2013
• Comment

Though public-private partnerships is encouraged, privately the government continues to retain its monopoly on research and development and defence production through the DRDO, the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs.

• Gurmeet Kanwal
• September 19, 2013
• Issue Brief

A closed loop feedback system for ensuring the quality of the Army equipment exists. Notwithstanding this, a number of Army equipment show a high failure rate at crucial times and are, therefore, a matter of great concern. These failed equipment have resulted in a number of avoidable casualties as well as restricted operational planning by tactical commanders in the field due to the non-availability of equipment for deployment, which results from their low reliability or high rates of failure.

• Mahendra Prasad
• July 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

Over the past decade, defence capital acquisition reforms have enhanced standardization, transparency and bigger acquisition budgets. Yet the system grapples with delays, cost escalations and gaps in operational preparedness. This article explores the structure, process and cultural dimensions of the acquisition system, unpacking the underlying linkages between policy, planning, budgeting, strategic direction, and outcomefocused analytical decision-making—factors that influence effectiveness of the procurement system.

• Vandana Kumar
• July 2013
• Journal of Defence Studies

Buy (Indian)’ the most important policy decision introduced through DPP 2013 suggests that it should be the first option or the most preferred category. It, however, gives rise to many questions.

• Amit Cowshish
• June 11, 2013
• Issue Brief