Rajiv Nayan

On 2 August, 1939, in a letter to the then President of the United States, FD Roosevelt, Albert Einstein wrote: “Some recent work by E Fermi and L Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and important source of energy in the immediate future.”

In the same letter, Einstein surmised, “This new phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and it is conceivable ­ though much less certain ­ that extremely powerful bombs of this type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.” Tragically, in 1945, the bombs made by the US were used to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to assist in the cessation of World War II.

The American bomb was built using African uranium. Countries that employ the metal for peaceful or military purposes have often looked beyond their shores to procure it.

When India launched its nuclear energy programme, with Homi Jahangir Bhabha as the principal architect, the first of three stages of the project was to rely on nuclear reactors using natural uranium for its fuel. India declared its nuclear weapons in 1998.

India has been surveying and exploring uranium since 1949. The Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD) undertakes survey, exploration and evaluation of uranium. The Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL) is responsible for mining and processing of uranium ore. After the AMD completes the final exploration of uranium, it hands over its findings to UCIL, in Jaduguda, Jharkhand.

The corporation is the only establishment responsible for mining and processing of uranium ore for commercial purposes. The metal it extracts is used for weapons and civil nuclear programmes. (Imported uranium is used for civil nuclear energy purposes only. Citing ‘public interest’, the government does not disclose the exact quantity of uranium produced in India.)

But information about the country’s uranium reserves is available in the public domain; in response to a question in Parliament, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) informed the house on December 23, 2015 that “as of November, 2015, AMD has established 2,29,936 tonnes in-situ U3O8 (1,94,985 tonnes of uranium) reserves.”

The Jaduguda complex houses all the seven of India’s active uranium mines (and two milling units) - Jaduguda, Bhatin, Turamdih, Bagjata, Narwapahar, Mohuldih, and Banduhurang (barring the last one, the rest are underground mines). I visited the complex four times in the last two years to gather material for my research on uranium governance – the first trip was in May 2013. The heat in Jharkhand was intolerable.

I

A week before Parliament was informed of India’s uranium stockpile, Adrian Levy, a reputed investigative journalist, known in India for his book, the Deception that brought to light both known and unknown facts about the murky nuclear business of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, published an article on the Jaduguda uranium complex. It alleged that nuclear scientists employed at the site, and villagers living near it were exposed to risk from exposure to water adultrated with radioactive alpha particles.

UCIL countered the Adrian Levy’s article by denying that there was any alarming radiation level in and around Jaduguda. It found that his piece was predominantly based on past reports, which were not predicated on scientific fact. Meanwhile, the Indian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) issued notices to UCIL, the secretary, DAE, the government, and the chief secretary, government of Jharkhand.

I find Levy’s article to be unnecessarily alarming. During my trips to Jaduguda complex, officials of UCIL and the Health Physics Unit Laboratory of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), which monitors radiation level in the complex, took me to all those places mentioned in the article without hesitation. One of these was the tailings pond, which has frequently figured in headlines. It is where waste from the milling stations is deposited.

There are four ponds in the Jaduguda complex: Two are filled up and the others are still in operation. These ponds have natural hills on three sides and an earthen bund covers the fourth side. The UCIL says the “design features of the earthen bund is based on nature and quantity of tailings, local geological features, sustainability under abnormal situations like heavy rain, flood etc. Fine solids of the slurry settle in the pond. The overflowing liquid, through a set of decantation wells, is led to the Effluent Treatment Plant in concrete channels. Vegetation of Typha latifolia, Saccharum spontanium, and Ipomoea carnia has covered the non-operational tailings ponds.”

I was shown the readings of radiation on the pipe that carries slur as well as the area 20-30 meters from the edge of the pond. The readings of the level of radiation were compared to the natural radiation existing in several towns. There was nothing unusual. In fact, the government has submitted readings of the levels of radiation at different places in and around the Jaduguda complex to the Jharkhand High Court when a petition was filed regarding the radiation level in the area.

II

As the control of atomic energy lies with the central government, its body or delegated authorities such as the DAE, its body AMD and the UCIL undertake regulatory or other atomic energy activities. Yet, a number of other central and state-level institutions ­ Ministry of Environment and Forests, State Pollution Control Boards, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and Directorate General of Mines Safety regulate uranium related activities with the help of laws and regulations.

There are general laws and institutions meant to regulate industrial activities in general and other related activities. Self-regulation is the dominant philosophy of the Indian atomic establishment. Yet, the nuclear establishment codifies through mechanisms other than the 1948 Act, which was later replaced by the current Atomic Energy Act in 1962. This act was amended a few more times. The Atomic Energy Act 1962 designates uranium as a “prescribed substance”, and the use of “prescribed substances” is to be carried out in provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1962, and the Atomic Energy (working of mines, minerals and handling of prescribed substances) Rules 1984.

India also regulates uranium with several laws, rules, codes and directives. These controlling regulatory mechanisms have evolved over the years. Currently, the Indian regulatory system categorises natural uranium as a Low Specific Activity (LSA)-1 material. AERB documents reflect publications and guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other multilateral and international bodies. However, if the AERB finds that IAEA codes and guidelines are inadequate for its purposes, it adds its own provisions. Some of the codes and guidelines for uranium too have such provisions. It is also responsible for safety reviews of transportation and training programmes.

India has to produce safe and risk-free uranium for its economic growth and security. But at the same time, anti-nuclear activists and writers don’t believe in those institutions created to guarantee that safety – regulatory bodies, monitoring authorities, or even the courts. To add, democratically elected governments will find it extremely difficult to simply ignore those people who live near or work in nuclear facilities. It is just as important to consider effects on the environment. Needless to say, an informed debate is required, but false propaganda only serves to hurt the country’s long-term prospects.

This article was originally published in First Post.

• 10 January, 2016 |

On the morning of 6 January, North Korea stunned the world by announcing that it had conducted a miniaturised hydrogen bomb test or thermo-nuclear device test. This test was conducted at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Several monitoring stations recorded this ‘man-made seismic event at the 5.1 magnitude’. According to the North Koreans, the test was a response to an aggressive United States. North Korean Television also announced: “We will not surrender our nuclear arms, even if the sky is falling.”

Reactions ranged from disbelief to acknowledgement that this was a long time coming. Several experts expressed scepticism about the authenticity of the news. The basic argument of this group was that North Korea does not have the capability to manage fission or what is generally considered a nuclear weapon, leave alone develop a hydrogen bomb. Some leading analysts are of the opinion that it could turn out to be a lower-yield ‘boosted explosion’, not the real hydrogen test. In this kind of test ‘hydrogen isotope tritium undergoes partial fusion, allowing them to describe the device as a hydrogen bomb’. This expression may be just a case of optimism in an odd situation.

To an extent, we may tend to agree with the view point that North Korea on its own may not conduct this kind of test. However, it needs to be remembered that the same scepticism was expressed when the country threatened to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, in 2006, it conducted a verified nuclear test and subsequently, it performed two more tests, in 2009 and 2013.

Kim_JongUn_APThe whole world knows that North Korea has benefited from the proliferation network. At that time, too, it did not have the capability to develop nuclear weapons on its own but the network provided it the required enrichment technology. Of the network countries, only China has demonstrated the capability to develop a thermonuclear device. Pakistan publicly admitted that it had not tested hydrogen bomb because it did not possess the capability to develop one.

If the announced test is of a hydrogen bomb, there is a great possibility that the proliferation network is still alive, and China is still the kingpin of this network. The proliferation network has become too sophisticated to be detected. The US has the greatest capability to really gather information on such sophisticated technology. But it seems to have lost the will to confront China directly. Even the western media is downplaying the role of China.

China’s condemnation of the test is being projected. The British media has reported that the British foreign minister and the Chinese leaders are seriously debating the mechanics of dealing with the situation in the wake of the test. The western leaders must run a reality check. The North Korean test could be a proxy exercise. As Pakistan does not want to come under pressure and China does not want to overtly appear a defiant country, they are using North Korea as a country to undertake tests for them. Such tests may continue in the future as well.

The global nuclear order will be tested. The international community may have to think about this extended deterrence which is going to affect the regional and at least extra-regional security arrangements. Some argue that as North Korea does not possess an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) it may not affect security or the deterrence structure of the US. Such an analysis is dismissive of extended deterrence, and China is a partner which possesses ICBMs.

India should not be a mute spectator to such a development. It must review its security and strategic options. The proliferation network that is feeding the weapons development programme of North Korea passes through India’s neighbourhood. A question mark on the success of its hydrogen bomb test has been raised. Even if India does not conduct nuclear tests immediately, it should weigh the options for doing so in the future.

Moreover, India must undertake serious strategic and diplomatic exercises with all important stakeholders affected by the test. It needs to ask the western world to pay more serious attention to the development. As of now, the western world seems to have outsourced the task of managing North Korea to China. It is a clear deception. China is using North Korea as its pawn and proxy in the great game. India may even propose South Korea and Japan to play a far more active role in the mediation and negotiations to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula.

The author is senior research associate, The Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses.

This article was originally published in First Post

• 7 January, 2016 |

Like a section of the US non-proliferation community that relishes supporting and sympathising with China and Pakistan, Levy and the Center for Public Integrity have followed the same approach.

• January 04, 2016 |
• Comment

It is unfortunate that ace journalists like Adrian Levy and R Jeffrey Smith had to struggle with facts while talking about India's nuclear security. The authors must know that while criticising nuclear India, they are doing more harm than good to the cause of nuclear security

The fourth and presumably final Nuclear Security Summit is going to take place in the US from March 31 to April 1, 2016. Expectedly, writings and views are being articulated to shape the agenda of the summit, much like it had been done in previous years. In 2014, for example, Washington, DC-based think-tank Nuclear Threat Initiative published its Nuclear Materials Security Index. This was the second edition of the controversial index and it was ignored, by and large, by national Governments because of its flawed methodology.

This year, it seems, the Washington, DC-based nonprofit digital news organisation, Center for Public Integrity, has taken the lead and been publishing articles on the subject. In mid-December, the organisation published a series of four articles on different aspects of nuclear India, authored by noted journalist Adrian Levy. One of the articles talks about India’s nuclear security. This article, ‘India’s nuclear explosive materials are vulnerable to theft, US officials and experts say’ is co-authored by The Washington Post reporter R Jeffrey Smith. Unfortunately, even reputed writers such as Mr Levy and Mr Smith have struggled with facts in the article.

Like other articles in the series, this one too has an agenda and, thus, a thesis that there is nothing good with nuclear India. The agenda seems to be that India should listen to what the Americans are saying directly or through foreign-funded non-government organisations. The facts and reports used to thrash nuclear India are old, and have been systematically and scientifically countered. Besides, the authors have exaggerated some incidents to prove that all is wrong with the Indian system.

For example, one stray shooting incident that involved a Central Industrial Security Force personnel made the authors conclude that the entire CISF is not capable of handling the physical security of nuclear installations. The authors should know that there are organisations and groups other than the CISF that manage the security of Indian nuclear installations even though it is true that the CISF provides physical protection to different layers of the many key nuclear installations.

The article quotes that CISF personnel are imparted special training before deployment. It needs to be added that the deployment of CISF to different layers or stages is done on the basis of threat perception. The Indian nuclear establishment and regulatory bodies like the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board have rules, codes, guidelines and manuals for physical protection of nuclear installations. These documents are regularly updated. The guiding documents take into consideration best practices in the world. The personnel providing physical security also receive training in foreign countries under international cooperation. Many security personnel have been trained in the US.

Besides, CISF officials in charge of physical protection maintain that India not only takes into account best practices from around the world, but also evolves and innovates its own mechanisms. Quite possibly, some of the redundant and outdated practices are discarded. Even such a change takes place after proper deliberations.

Likewise, the CISF is expected to buy the weapon required for physical or other protection, not the costly toys (weapons) sold by foreign countries.

Similarly, the authors give an account of an American official who was checked quickly but not thoroughly at one of the nuclear sites in India. This sounds ridiculous. There could be two possibilities. First, the Indian system is efficient. Second, Indian agencies may have completed all the necessary checks on the concerned official.

Foreign visitors come occasionally to nuclear sites and the entire system knows about them. What may have happened is that only required checks would have been performed on the American official who was, in any way, sent by the US Government to visit the Bhabha Atomic Research Center. Do the authors expect the Indian officials to behave as foolishly as the American security officials generally do at their immigration counters or elsewhere?

The authors also record the ‘surprise’ of US and Indian officials regarding poor security of transportation of nuclear materials. This entire argument is based on ignorance. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has made public, the detailed guidelines for transportation of nuclear materials. The route of transportation is confidential, so is the identity of the vehicle. It is to go under protection. Depending on the route, the security forces of the concerned State Government(s) are contacted. The security agency responsible for transportation may modify the planned route, but it has to coordinate with relevant security agencies.

The article also provides “a series of documented nuclear security lapses”. These documented lapses are wide-ranging from theft of uranium to poisoning of water. On all of these so-called lapses, the AERB and the Department of Atomic Energy have already filed their replies. Most of the listed lapses turned out to be hoax calls.

The police and journalists reporting the incidents did not have instrument to judge whether the material claimed as uranium was really uranium and of what type. Only after examination of the competent authorities, materials were properly recognised. The authors either did not take the trouble to cross check the claims or were committed to establishing something without taking all the factors into account.

For years, particularly after the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Western countries have been pushing for one particular centre. India is also setting up its own centre of excellence: In 2010, in Washington, the then Prime Minister announced the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership to perform the same task for which the Western countries were pushing that particular organisation.

Some Western Governments and non-profits tried to demean the Indian centre and kept promoting that particular organisation. The Center for Public Integrity, in its article, did the same thing: It created curiosity for persons like us and anxiety in the Indian nuclear establishment.

Actually, this is nothing but an intimidatory tactic to procure more information on the Indian nuclear programme in general and its weapons programme in particular. Some Western Governments have been both discreet and blunt about it. The authors and Western Governments need to know that their approach is doing more harm than good to the cause of nuclear security in the long-run.

This article was originally published in The Pioneer.

• 31 December, 2015 |

On April 2, 2013, the UNGA approved the draft text of the ATT- 154 countries voted for the treaty, three voted against and 23 abstained. It remains to be seen whether the treaty succeeds in fulfilling the goal of curbing violence in Africa.

• November-December 2015 |
• Africa Trends

Expediting India’s membership process would be a win-win situation for both India and the MTCR. The prevailing uncertainty will end for India and the MTCR will get an effective and positive member.

• October 16, 2015 |
• Comment

As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.

• September 15, 2014 |
• Comment

The success of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 should not make the international community overlook persisting problems. The objective of the 1540 is to internationalise WMD security by targeting the entire supply chain.

• April 28, 2014 |
• Comment

In the years to come, a lot more activity on nuclear security can be expected and much of it will arise from the commitment taken by states at the three nuclear security summits and the voluntary pledges undertaken by different countries. A good deal of pressure from civil society and think tanks on nuclear security issues can be expected.

• March 29, 2014 |
• Comment

There are no properly functioning Asian security institutions or regimes to regulate Asia’s nuclear politics and has to rely on global institutions and regimes for regulation of its nuclear politics and management of nuclear order. Treaties like the NPT are struggling to provide stability in the world as in Asia.

• March 28, 2014 |
• Comment