A. Vinod Kumar

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.

• December 06, 2014 |
• Issue Brief

The editorial also intrinsically marks the return of the ‘pro-Pakistan’ lobby in the US non-proliferation community, and the American media, which was culpable in encouraging the many indulgences of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment for many decades and facilitating favourable non-proliferation policies for Pakistan to effectively pursue a clandestine nuclear programme with technological aid from Western companies.

• July 07, 2014 |
• Comment

If Chinese companies eventually end up bidding for Urenco, there is no reason why Indian companies should not do so. India can form a joint-venture with counterparts in Brazil, South Africa and, if needed, China (even Russia) using common interests envisioned through forums like the IBSA or BRICS to enter this race.

• November 13, 2013 |
• Issue Brief

Fifteen years after the nuclear tests, it is relevant to examine if deterrence remains weak in South Asia or has consolidated towards greater stability.

• June 10, 2013 |
• Comment

The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.

• February 22, 2013 |
• Comment

As India celebrates a century of its cinematic culture, there is a need to elevate its quality and role to complement India’s power profile and socio-cultural aspirations.

• February 12, 2013 |
• Comment

The year 2011 will stand out in history as the year of the Arab Spring, when people in Northern Africa and West Asia rose up against tyranny and revolted for political emancipation.

• January 04, 2012 |
• Issue Brief

Prime Minister Gillard's decision to reverse the uranium export policy not just indicates a dramatic shift in Australia’s strategic outlook, but also could endow a decisive fillip to its crisis-hit uranium industry.

• November 21, 2011 |
• Comment

The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.

• July 2011 |
• Strategic Analysis

President Obama made history by coming to office with the promise of working towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Envisioning a new non-proliferation momentum, Obama promised to revive the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) system and create nuclear security and energy architectures that will secure nuclear materials and make proliferation difficult. A year later, Obama realised the difficulties of selling his vision to his bureaucratic-military establishment, which resisted efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while pushing for nuclear modernisation.

• March 2011 |
• Strategic Analysis