There is an overwhelming sense of déjà vu in Kashmir today. This could have been deemed tiresome but for the grave implications it has for us as a nation, and as a people. We are now used to long cycles of violence interspersed by political ennui or tokenism and the ubiquitous ‘economic package’ which only serves to open up newer avenues for corruption in a state orphaned by history and politics for over six decades.

• Wilson John
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

Insurgencies as well as popular unrests are generally rooted in political, social and economic deprivations, which in turn lead to the alienation and estrangement of a community. A popular sentiment seeking the empowerment of Muslim Kashmiris has been in existence for the past five centuries. History is replete with instances of the political deprivation and poverty of Kashmiri people during periods of their subjugation by the Mughals, the Pathans, the Sikhs and later the Dogras. Kashmiri alienation took firm roots during the Dogra rule (1846–1947).

• Iftikhar Gilani
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The demand for autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) followed by heated discourses on the subject has been appearing and fading intermittently. The demand as well as discourses, articulated by particular parties in the state, receives equal responses from political parties and analysts at the national level. In fact, the subject has acquired sharp political overtones over a period of time.

• Riyaz Punjabi
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

The spate of rioting which plagued Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) from June 2010 is testimony to the mismanagement of developments by both the state and central governments. This is all the more unfortunate as near normalcy had been established in Jammu and Kashmir following the November 2008 elections and the downtrend in insurgency through 2009 and early 2010.

• Satish Chandra
• March 2011
• Strategic Analysis

Terrorism in the Indian hinterland is the result of a complex set of inter-related factors. The development of a jihad culture in Pakistan during the course of the Afghan conflict in the 1980s led to the subsequent Pakistani decision to employ jihad against India as a strategy. The mobilisation of the Hindu Right in India and ensuing communal violence led to the radicalisation of Muslim youth and the resort to terrorism by both Indian Islamists and Muslim criminal networks with help from Pakistan.

• S. Kalyanaraman
• September 2010
• Strategic Analysis

There is a view that India's approach to national security is largely ad hoc and marked by incompetence. Indians as well as foreign commentators on the country's security policies seem to share this perception. However, India does have a security approach that has a discernible pattern and arguably has been a success. This comment focuses on how India has dealt with internal security since independence.

• Kanti Bajpai
• September 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Left Wing Extremism (LWE) presents a serious internal security challenge to India that needs careful and coordinated policy response from both the security front and the development front. For the CPI (Maoists) (Communist Party of India), the main outfit propagating LWE, the plan and execution of this style of people's war against the state is like the Churchillian ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’. At one level, the LWE can be described as a ‘Democratic revolution through tactical offensive with tactical speed in the protracted people's war of strategic defensive’.

• Giridhari Nayak
• July 2010
• Strategic Analysis

Why are the two largest democracies – India and the United States – starkly different when it comes to tackling terrorism? The answer to this perplexing question could lie in the two countries' divergent approach to security and management of national security resources. Equally relevant is the variance in their political resoluteness in exercising suitable responses to emergent threats.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• November 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Linked to the terrorist goal of intimidation of a targeted population, there is an inherent objective to spread fear and undermine the declared values of the targeted political system by pushing a frightened society and government into overreaction. On the other hand, the counter-insurgent state wishes to downplay the impact of the terrorist attack and works towards keeping the morale of the population as well as the security forces intact. In this battle, the media plays an important and influential role.

• Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The Union Government took notice of the current phase of the Naxalite challenge with concern, for the first time, in 1998. Since then, it has been playing a coordinating role among the various affected states to address the challenge. It has also been advising the affected states on ways to deal with the challenge. By 2003, the Union Government had put in place a two-pronged approach to address the Maoist challenge - that of a development response and a security response. However, all along, the Union Government's response has largely been security-centric.

• P. V. Ramana
• September 2009
• Strategic Analysis

The notification regarding modification of area of jurisdiction of the BSF focuses on prevention of illegal migration and cross-border crimes. It is important that the BSF trains its personnel about various Acts and sections of the CrPC and work towards better coordination with the other agencies.

• Pushpita Das
• November 01, 2021
• Comment

The inter-state border disputes in the Northeast have persisted for long. Efforts need to be redoubled to find a political solution, mediated by the Union government, which is binding on all the states concerned in the Northeast.

• Pushpita Das
• July 29, 2021
• Issue Brief

Taking positive measures to address the core issues of misgovernance and corruption and ensuring fair and rightful distribution of resources will help in the revival of the political process in Jammu and Kashmir.

• Nazir Ahmad Mir
• July 22, 2021
• Comment

With reduced levels of violent incidents and overall death tolls, the security situation in the Northeast has indubitably improved. However, there remain areas of concern that need to be addressed in a timely and suitable manner.

• Pushpita Das
• July 08, 2020
• Issue Brief

Although initially the Maoists suffered some setbacks due to the lockdown, their indulgence in violent incidents over the past one month indicates that they are exploiting the situation to have an upper hand vis-à-vis security forces.

• Rajbala Rana , Mathew Sinu Simon
• April 28, 2020
• Comment

While the third Bodo accord is a momentous development in the history of the Bodo conflict, caution must be exercised to ensure that it does not fall victim to the factional politics that undermined previous accords.

• Alex Waterman
• February 19, 2020
• Issue Brief

CAA is a humanitarian gesture. Efforts of the government to allay apprehensions regarding CAA by countering misinformation is a welcome step. A better understanding and appreciation of CAA by the people is expected to reduce opposition to the Act.

• Pushpita Das
• January 21, 2020
• Comment

The ISIS may be down but not out as it is in the process of regrouping. A large number of their cadres are known to have survived. Any relaxation of pressure will give ISIS room for manoeuvre and ability to garner support of local allies.

• G.G. Dwivedi
• November 13, 2019
• Comment

If Baghdadi has possibly moved toward the east, then the proclamation of an Indian branch flashes a note of caution for the security and intelligence agencies.

• Uddipan Mukherjee
• May 17, 2019
• Comment

Are the Maoists focusing more on IED-based blasts and in the process minimizing their own casualties instead of attempting to win a war of attrition by inflicting tactical and psychological blows to the security forces?

• Uddipan Mukherjee
• May 07, 2019
• Comment