This paper explores the paradox of US policy on dual-use technology cooperation with China in the face of resistance from a strong section of the security establishment. The paper examines the factors contributing to the current level of dual-use technology business between the two countries. It finds that the US Cold War grand strategy of co-opting China by dividing the socialist bloc has resulted in embedded commercial interests that have been further bolstered by the strategic need for ties with China.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The most visible manifestation of a strategic relationship between two countries is cooperation in the defence sphere. When the Defence Framework Agreement was signed in June 2005, it was widely assumed that the Agreement provided a skeleton that would be fleshed out over a period of time.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

The article considers why New Delhi has shied away from full participation in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative despite compelling national interests in improving Indian maritime forces and cooperating with the United States at sea. Some factors examined are polarized domestic politics, Indians' ambivalence about non-proliferation arrangements that formerly targeted them, and New Delhi's desire for regional primacy. Until Indian leaders come to believe that the benefits of PSI participation outweigh its drawbacks, they will continue to hold the initiative at arm's length.

• James R. Holmes
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

In the European security calculus, terrorism has become one of the key strategic threats. Alarmingly, the continent has also become a centre of radical Islamist propaganda and activism, with a number of European countries worried over the potential of their own 'home-grown' religious extremists. Latest studies indicate a disturbing trend of a section of the youth, generally belonging to the Muslim communities of West African and South Asian origin from a poor or middle class socioeconomic background, embracing extremism and terrorism in Europe.

• Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
• March 2007
• Strategic Analysis

Despite its excellent record in the field of non-proliferation of technologies, know-how and equipment related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to other states, India has been essentially a passive actor in global non-proliferation initiatives. As a result, it does not as yet have a comprehensive framework or strategy within which it defines its anti-proliferation objectives.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• January 2007
• Strategic Analysis

With the not so unexpected North Korean nuclear test on October 9, 2006 the world has entered into yet another nuclear age. Regional tension is the inevitable corollary of the new nuclear situation. Many apprehend East Asia may become a nuclear flashpoint. Quite naturally, the international community is closely watching the emergent situation. The United States (US) as a major and traditional stakeholder both in the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and security management in East Asia is actively involved in diplomacy to deal with the fallout of the North Korean nuclear test.

• Rajiv Nayan
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The October 9 North Korean nuclear test has emerged as a major diplomatic challenge as well as an opportunity for China. China has sent mixed signals in response to the United Nations (UN) 1718 Resolution of October 14 on North Korea. It has agreed to the inspection of North Korea’s inbound and outbound trade to prevent any illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. China Daily reported that Chinese border officials have started checking trucks at the border with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

• Abanti Bhattacharya
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The recent nuclear test carried out by North Korea in defiance of warnings by the international community has significantly raised Japan’s security concerns. The test conducted on October 9, 2006 made Pyongyang the second nuclear weapon state in North East Asia after China. It was carried out in the backdrop of already heightened tensions in the region following a set of multiple missile launches by Pyongyang on 5 July 2006. The missiles which had plunged into the Sea of Japan, had even evoked calls for preemptive strikes from a section of the political and defense establishment in Tokyo.

• Arpita Mathur
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

The testing of a nuclear device by North Korea (hereafter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) on October 9 has brought to the fore South Korea’s (hereafter the Republic of Korea – ROK) measured and considered response calibrated in such a manner as to force the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. The DPRK conducted its nuclear test even as the ROK President, Roh Moo-hyun was presiding over an emergency cabinet meeting called to discuss DPRKs preparations for a nuclear test.

• Raviprasad Narayanan
• October 2006
• Strategic Analysis

North Korea’s and Iran’s showdown with the US and the West on the nuclear proliferation issue are closely related to their dubious proliferation connections with the Pakistan-based A Q Khan network. Yet, Pakistan has announced that the case against Khan and his proliferation cohorts is closed. To comprehensively understand the nonproliferation challenges, it is crucial that the details about the network’s operations as also about Khan’s associates as well as their benefactors are publicly revealed.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• April 2006
• Strategic Analysis

There are no properly functioning Asian security institutions or regimes to regulate Asia’s nuclear politics and has to rely on global institutions and regimes for regulation of its nuclear politics and management of nuclear order. Treaties like the NPT are struggling to provide stability in the world as in Asia.

• Rajiv Nayan
• March 28, 2014
• Comment

Riyadh anticipates that in the long run a nuclear Iran will be challenging Saudi’s proxy conflicts with Iran in states like Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Amidst such concerns, Riyadh’s rejection of a UN Security Council seat in October 2013 followed by the revelation of the BBC news about possible nuclear weapons cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in November 2013 has raised questions whether Riyadh aspires to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

• Reshmi Kazi
• January 07, 2014
• Issue Brief

The November 24, 2013 Joint Plan of Action between Iran and its P5+1 interlocutors is the first agreement since November 2004 that contains Iran’s acceptance of certain short-term limitations on its nuclear programme.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• December 09, 2013
• Issue Brief

The interim deal was signed by seven foreign ministers of US, UK , France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran but the deal was not negotiated mainly in Geneva, but in Muscat and other locations where the US and Iran met secretly for months. Essentially, it is a deal between US and Iran and the rest were there to serve a choreographic purpose.

• K. P. Fabian
• November 28, 2013
• Comment

The reported offer of China to sell 1000 MWe reactors to Pakistan has raised a number of issues. China applied for NSG membership in 2004 only after being satisfied that it can safeguard its nuclear commerce with Pakistan even after joining NSG. It must be clearly understood that China’s application for joining NSG was at the repeated appeals of NSG and not the other way around.

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• November 15, 2013
• Issue Brief

After wining the elections, Hassan Rouhani has insisted that Iran is ‘ready to show more transparency’ over its nuclear programme, but has also affirmed that it has ‘inalienable rights’ to enrich uranium as a member of the NPT.

• S. Samuel C. Rajiv , G. Balachandran
• August 06, 2013
• Issue Brief

The Koondankulam plant has finally attained criticality but doubts will continue to be raised about the safety of the reactors. What do nuclear risk assessment methods tell us about the possibility of future accidents at KKNPP?

• G. Balachandran , Kapil Patil
• August 02, 2013
• Comment

Some of the members are expressing unnecessary apprehensions regarding India’s membership. Unlike China, India has a track record of complying with obligations of any treaty or agreement it signs.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 29, 2013
• Comment

The Prague plenary seemingly skirted the ongoing China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, now a well known chronic weakness of the NSG. Even the public statement did not mention a single line about this collaboration.

• Rajiv Nayan
• July 11, 2013
• Comment

Japan’s endorsement of India’s candidature for the four major multilateral export controls regimes seems to be the principal achievement of the Indian PM visit to Japan.

• Rajiv Nayan
• June 11, 2013
• Comment