Major powers have tried to use military training programmes, manifested through military-to-military cooperation running the gamut of training exchanges to joint exercises, to defence-related dialogues through seminars and the like, in order to engage and influence other countries in the furtherance of their strategic interests. The US model is notable for being innovative, flexible, scalable, and broad in its approach, and this has fetched it considerable dividends.

• Cherian Samuel
• March 2009
• Strategic Analysis

Improved India-Vietnam relations are guided both by their common historical experiences and their mutual concerns in the post-cold war context. Both have suffered aggression from China in the past and had good relations with the former Soviet Union. In fact, India was the only non-communist country to recognize the unified Vietnam and, ever since, they have had a friendly relationship, one that has stood the test of time. However, in the post-cold war context the shadow of China looms large over this relationship.

• Pankaj K Jha
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

The 1998 Belfast Agreement brought to an end over three decades of armed conflict in Northern Ireland. This paper summarizes the role of actors within and outside Northern Ireland, and the processes and mechanics of the Agreement itself. The Agreement is placed in the context of previous unsuccessful peace initiatives in the region, and elements within the political and economic environment at the time that facilitated agreement are identified. The consociational nature of the Agreement is set alongside concern about continuing sectarian division.

• Marie Breen-Smyth
• November 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Being a non-NPT state with advanced nuclear capability, India's contributions to the non-proliferation movement have often been scrutinized. India was for long treated as part of the 'proliferation problem'. Since the 1998 tests, there is a steady process of integrating India with the international nuclear community. However, India is reluctant to assimilate with many of the US-promoted counter-proliferation initiatives though it has largely adopted the normative standards of the NPT system.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• September 2008
• Strategic Analysis

This article offers a Chinese perspective on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons due to nuclear weapons proliferation and its deterrent gestures, long employed since the Cold War. It is pointed out that nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to nuclear weapons states. However, some non-nuclear weapons states may view this differently. Nuclear abolition has presented a visionary opportunity for all sides to relinquish those weapons increasingly unnecessary for nuclear weapons states.

• Dingli Shen
• July 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Jason Miklian
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

• Reshmi Kazi
• May 2008
• Strategic Analysis

Today, it is necessary for India to respond to the current crisis of the NPT and weigh its options vis-a-vis the Treaty. This paper is an attempt to explore answers to the question of what ought to be India's policy in the light of the new nuclear reality. It analyses three policy options that India could pursue and concludes that India must strive to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon country, because joining the non-proliferation regime by evading the NPT is likely to prove costly and is also unlikely to remove destabilizing irritants.

• Rajiv Nayan
• November 2007
• Strategic Analysis

• A. Vinod Kumar , J Nandakumar
• November 2007
• Strategic Analysis

India is uniquely placed in the international security and political environment as it neither falls within the NPT 'definition' of 'nuclear weapon states' nor is it a country that can be ignored in any international arrangement without taking into account the reality of its being a state with nuclear weapons capability. At a time when proliferation challenges are assuming disturbing levels, this article seeks to examine the policy options available for India to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

• Rajesh Kumar Mishra
• September 2007
• Strategic Analysis

There is a general feeling among analysts that while US government lawyers may have been satisfied that the CLNDA is compatible with CSC in light of explanations offered by the Indian government, this view is being reportedly challenged by nuclear industry lawyers.

• G. Balachandran
• February 19, 2015
• Issue Brief

While the exact nature of the understanding between the two countries is yet to be announced and in fact may never be officially released, it is possible to offer an outline of the possible “memorandum” with possible understandings on all the three liability issues as well as the administrative arrangements.

• G. Balachandran
• February 10, 2015
• Issue Brief

India’s nuclear deal with the US is driven less by technology requirements than by the need to be integrated into the global nuclear community and gain access to uranium imports for fuelling its nuclear power expansion plans.

• Sarosh Bana
• February 10, 2015
• Comment

India is already in de facto observance of the spirit of the CTBT by maintaining its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Given that additional nuclear tests may not be needed, it could well reconsider its current position on signing the treaty.

• Reshmi Kazi
• December 24, 2014
• Issue Brief

India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act has emerged as an appropriate template that could rekindle the nuclear energy sector while also safeguarding the public interest.

• A. Vinod Kumar , Kapil Patil
• December 06, 2014
• Issue Brief

As Australia and India have to deepen their security cooperation for a peaceful prosperous and stable Asia-Pacific region, both the countries will have to manage global nuclear commerce together.

• Rajiv Nayan
• September 15, 2014
• Comment

The editorial also intrinsically marks the return of the ‘pro-Pakistan’ lobby in the US non-proliferation community, and the American media, which was culpable in encouraging the many indulgences of the Pakistani military and nuclear establishment for many decades and facilitating favourable non-proliferation policies for Pakistan to effectively pursue a clandestine nuclear programme with technological aid from Western companies.

• A. Vinod Kumar
• July 07, 2014
• Comment

“Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

• Satish Chandra
• April 30, 2014
• Issue Brief

The success of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 should not make the international community overlook persisting problems. The objective of the 1540 is to internationalise WMD security by targeting the entire supply chain.

• Rajiv Nayan
• April 28, 2014
• Comment

In the years to come, a lot more activity on nuclear security can be expected and much of it will arise from the commitment taken by states at the three nuclear security summits and the voluntary pledges undertaken by different countries. A good deal of pressure from civil society and think tanks on nuclear security issues can be expected.

• Arvind Gupta , Rajiv Nayan
• March 29, 2014
• Comment