The East Asia Centre is dedicated to study and research the domestic and foreign policies of individual countries of the region as well as India’s multifaceted relationships with these countries. With respect to China, the Centre’s research foci are its foreign policy (particularly towards the US, Russia, Central Asia and Asia Pacific), domestic politics, economy, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and India’s relationship with China in all its dimensions. The Centre’s research also focuses on Taiwan, its domestic politics, Sino-Taiwanese relationship and Indo-Taiwanese relationship, Hong Kong and India-Hong Kong relations. Japan and Korea are the other major focus of the Centre, with its research focused on their domestic politics, foreign policy and comprehensive bilateral relationships with India. The geopolitics of the Asia Pacific and the Korean peninsula are also studied in the Centre.
The centre brings out five monthly newsletters: East Asia Military Monitor, Japan Digest, China Science and Technology, Korea Newsletter, and China Military Digest.
IDSA Asian Strategic Review 2008, the second volume in the series of Annual Surveys revived by the Institute in the previous year, is divided into six sections.
The 21st century has been described as the ‘Asian Century.’ Home to 60 per cent of the world’s population and accounting for one-fourth of its Gross Domestic Product, by 2050, Asia will also have three of the world’s largest economies—China, India, and Japan. A dynamic hub in this rising Asia is the Southeast Asian region—encompassing diverse countries, peoples and cultures. The 9th Asian Security Conference addressed a range of issues and trends affecting this crucial region and their implications for regional and Asian security.
The volume, divided into four sections, deals with strategic developments pertaining to Asia. Recognising the diverse 'push' and 'pull' factors impinging on a country's strategic posture, the volume starts off by dealing with issues which the Advisory Committee of Experts guiding this publication felt were of immediate relevance.
Publishers: Promilla & Co. and Bibliphile South Asia
ISBN: 81-85002-76-2
Rs. 295
US $ 14.95
Publishers: IDSA and Promilla & Co.
ISBN: 81-86019-51-9
Rs 1350
US $ 50
Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-189-9
Rs 650
US $ 55
Publisher: Roli
ISBN: 81-7436-310-6
Rs 450
Publishers: IDSA and Shipra
ISBN: 81-7541-167-8
Rs 1250
US $ 80
Publisher: IDSA & Knowledge World
ISBN: 81-86019-37-5
Rs. 650
The article discusses if China will be inspired by its strategic partner Russia to use force as an instrument of its foreign policy. After a pro et con discussion the authors find that the disincentives created by the Russian example are likely to convince China that it should continue to show restraint under the ‘peaceful development’ formula, and avoid military adventures. The East Asian Peace is thus not seriously threatened, at least not by China—for now.
Since 2012, Japan’s foreign policy under Prime Minister (PM) Abe has been characterized as assertive, welcome or provocative. By employing the fear of abandonment/entrapment theory as the analytical framework, this article finds that Japan’s regional foreign policy under Abe is characterized by consolidation and investment in broad-based multilateralism, proactive engagement with partners in the region, including China, and strategic hedging.
The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative.
In a strong response to the nuclear warhead test of Pyongyang on September 9, 2016, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at its 7821st meeting, held on November 30, 2016, adopted Resolution 2321 (2016)—officially known as S/RES/2321—imposing fresh sanctions on the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). The Resolution specifically imposes restrictions on the DPRK’s exports that assist Pyongyang in generating revenue for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
In Smart Diplomacy: Exploring China-India Synergy, P.S. Suryanarayana has sought to answer the questions: ‘Will China and India live at peace with each other? Will they be able to overcome the deficit of trust between them? Will they be able to find amicable solutions to their disputes over their borders, Pakistan, Tibet, rivers, and trade, etc.?’ (p. iv). These questions, raised by Ambassador Tommy Koh in his foreword to the book, concern all those who want a stable and productive future for the two countries that Suryanarayana characterizes as the sunrise powers of the 21st century.
Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in November 2012 and the President of the People’s Republic of China in March 2013. Ever since, under his leadership as the Chinese President, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been progressively tightening its control over the media. In a Communist structure, the media is perceived to be the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Party and is supposed to be used for propaganda. Media is a very essential tool in spreading the government agenda and controlling the public discourse.
Prof P. Stobdan (Senior Fellow, IDSA)’s reading of history fails to predict Tibet’s future from the beginning. The Dalai Lama has informed the Tibetan people about his thinking on the succession issue since as early as 1969. Later on September 24, 2011, the Dalai Lama took a definite position on the succession issue, where the Dalai Lama made it very clear that the decision to continue or not continue with the institution of the Dalai Lama lies with the Tibetan people. The real reason for ‘Younghusband’s visit’ to Tibet was not to lay a telegraph line.
An investigation into the prospects for including political talks in the cross-strait dialogue enables a better assessment of cross-strait relations. China’s push for political talks and Taiwan’s resistance to them imply that their political positions on the fundamental issues of sovereignty and ‘living space’ for Taiwan remain unchanged. Considering Taiwan’s complex domestic political scenario, which is largely against unification with Mainland China, the likelihood of Taiwan agreeing to political talks for unification is remote.
In November 2012, soon after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Xi Jinping put forward for the first time the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’. In March 2013, Xi further elaborated on this concept at the closing ceremony of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress.
Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature.
The efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure will depend on the member-states’ ability to focus on countering terrorism concerns while managing their divergent regional interests.
The Indian media exhibited a very negative assessment of the 20th CPC Congress and of Xi Jinping’s third term.
The growing insecurity and threat perceptions articulated in the 20th Party Congress Work Report by Chinese President Xi Jinping indicates that Beijing is likely to become more assertive and belligerent in its international dealings.
China is making increasing use of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), among others, to modernise the People’s Liberation Army.
The PLA Western Theatre Command has focused on joint operations capabilities to counter the perceived lack of air superiority and information dominance in the theatre, which it believes is required for strike operations.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has established a leadership and command system to enhance its capability to conduct joint operations.
Several Belt and Road Initiative projects pass through ecologically sensitive areas and in countries with weak environmental laws and governance.
Beijing’s pushback against the Washington-backed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is likely to result in an intense regional geo-economic competition.
Hydropower cooperation between India and Bhutan should not only help achieve the larger aspirations of the Bhutanese people for peace, prosperity and happiness but also further strengthen bilateral bonds.
The Chinese news media has peddled dual narrative of vilifying the West and glorifying China’s supposed mediatory role in the Russia–Ukraine crisis.
