A Requiem for 2016
Higher Defence Management, Civil-military relations and force modernisation were three critical areas in which there was little or no movement in the year gone by.
- Amit Cowshish
- January 02, 2017
India spends a significant amount of resources on its national defence. Efficiency in utilisation of resources is not only an economic imperative but vital for defence preparedness. In view of this, the Defence Economics and Industry Centre was created in 2006 to promote research on various economic aspects of India’s defence. Since its inception, the Centre has undertaken a number of policy relevant studies besides constantly engaging vital stakeholders (Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces and Industry) on a range of issues. The major focus areas of the Centre are:
No posts of Books and Monograph.
No posts of Jounral.
Higher Defence Management, Civil-military relations and force modernisation were three critical areas in which there was little or no movement in the year gone by.
The biggest lesson that India can borrow is France’s integrated and centralised procurement structure, which has the dual responsibility of arms acquisition and defence industrial development.
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) is preparing to undergo a major expansion programme. India can assist in enhancing and developing PNGDF’s capabilities without coming into conflict or competition with the Australian interests.
Should GRSE and GSL deliver satisfactory services to their export customers, there is considerable potential for India to position itself as a competitive supplier of small and medium warships and patrol crafts.
It is rare that a foreign company makes a huge investment to produce major platforms in a third country with a view to make that country an export hub.
While it may be tempting for the Niti Aayog to make deep inroads into defence planning, it would be wise to focus only on those areas that do not disturb the core function of defence preparedness.
If a product is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, should the percentage of indigenous content in that product really matter so much?
The Task Force has not extended the principle of Strategic Partnership to the whole gamut of big contracts in which the private sector is supposed to play a major role. And it visualises strategic partners as poor cousins of state-owned entities.
Introduction of the ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ procurement category, the revamped ‘Make’ procedure, structural change in AAP, and higher and flexible indigenous content requirement in certain procurement categories are all likely to deepen the involvement of domestic industry in defence production.
‘Transfer of Technology’ does not magically elevate defence production capabilities to cutting-edge levels and help attain future self-reliance because technology sellers employ restrictive trade practices to prevent such an eventuality.